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An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice pre-Appointment Experience  
 
Benjamin H. Barton1 
 This study compares the years of experience that preceded appointment to 
the Supreme Court for each Justice.  The study seeks to demonstrate that the 
background experiences of the Roberts Court Justices are quite different from the 
Justices of earlier Supreme Courts and to persuade the reader that this is 
insalubrious.   
The first proposition is an empirical one and the difference in Justice 
backgrounds is demonstrable.  To determine how the current Justices compare to 
their historical peers, the study gathered a massive database that considers the 
yearly pre-Court experience for every Supreme Court Justice from John Jay to Elena 
Kagan.  The results are startling and telling: the Roberts Court Justices have spent 
more pre-appointment time in legal academia, appellate judging, and living in 
Washington, D.C. than any previous Supreme Court.2  They also spent the most time 
in elite undergraduate and law school settings.3  Time spent in these pursuits has 
naturally meant less time elsewhere: The Roberts Court Justices spent less time in 
the private practice of law, in trial judging, and as elected politicians than any 
previous Court. 
                                                        
1
  Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.  B.A. 1991, Haverford College; J.D. 1996, 
University of Michigan.  The author gives special thanks to Brannon Denning, Glenn Reynolds, Lee 
Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott A. Hendrickson, Jason 
M. Roberts, Jack Knight, Andrew D. Martin, Indya Kincannon, Jeff Hirsch, Jennifer Hendricks, Wendy 
Bach, Emily Moran, and the University of Tennessee College of Law for generous research support, and 
the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz. 
2
  This assertion and those that follow in this paragraph are all explained and demonstrated infra __. 
3
  The study treats the ivy league universities and Stanford as elite institutions. 
Having demonstrated that the Roberts Justices are outliers across multiple 
studied experiences, the article argues that the change is regretful for three 
normative reasons.  First, the current Justices have been chosen largely on the basis 
of academic and professional achievements evincing technical excellence in legal 
reasoning and writing.  These strengths are weaknesses in an era where the Court’s 
opinions are growing longer,4 more splintered5 and ever more complex.6   
Second, the Supreme Court is the leading player in the drafting, amending 
and interpretation of the various federal rules,7 and these Justices have less 
courtroom experience (as lawyers or trial judges) than prior Justices.   
Lastly, these Justices have a great deal of experience in cloistered and neutral 
jobs like appellate judging or teaching law and limited experience in jobs that 
require more interaction with the public and litigants, like trial judging, practicing 
law, or running for office.  These cloistered and neutral experiences offer limited 
opportunities for the development of the most critical judicial virtue: practical 
wisdom.8    
                                                        
4
  Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions, 45 HOUSTON L. REV. 621, 632-38 (2008) (demonstrating empirically the growth in opinion 
length over the history of the Court). 
5
  James F. Spriggs, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 519 (2011) (“Historically, plurality 
decisions by the Supreme Court have been relatively rare . . . the frequency of plurality opinions 
dramatically increased in the 1940s and 1950s, the occurrence of plurality opinions between 1953 and 2006 
has remained fairly steady, with a moderate increase during the 1970s when Warren Burger served as Chief 
Justice.”); Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” Dissent, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1305, 1306-26 (2011) (discussing the growth in the dissenting opinion and the word “respectfully”). 
6
  See Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions 46 
UCLA L. REV. 75, 126-27 (1998) (finding increased complexity and obfuscation in Supreme Court federal 
jurisdiction opinions).  Consider Richard Posner’s classic critique from Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 579 
(7th Cir. 2007): “The multiplication of rules and standards, carrying in its train as it does endless debate 
over boundaries, is one of the banes of the American legal system, a source of its appalling complexity.” 
7
  See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1100-4 (2002). 
8
  Discussed infra __. 
 There has been a spate of recent commentary on the pre-appointment 
experiences of the Justices on the Roberts Court.  Some have argued that the current 
Supreme Court Justices are overly similar: they all went to Harvard or Yale Law 
School,9 excluding Justice Kagan, they are all former judges on a federal circuit court 
of appeal,10 and they represent limited geographical diversity.11  Others have 
expressed concern that none of the current Justices have been politicians.12  Piecing 
these critiques together, there is a concern that the experiences of the Roberts 
Justices are quite distinct from past Justices and that these differences are 
deleterious.13   
Nevertheless, this study is the first to take a broad overview of all of these 
factors.  The question of whether the backgrounds of the current Justices are 
substantially different from past Justices is an empirical one, and this study attempts 
to determine the accuracy of these criticisms.  The study collects and analyzes the 
annual pre-appointment experiences of every Justice and every sitting Supreme 
                                                        
9
  See Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant: The Legal Education of the Justices From Holmes to 
Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 129, 129-31 (2010) (arguing against the dominance of Harvard and 
Yale on the current Court); Christopher Edley, Jr., The Elite, No Apology Needed, WASH. POST, May 16, 
2010, at B1 (arguing the opposite). 
10
  See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and its 
Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003); Tracey E. 
George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1333 
(2008). 
11
  See Tim Padgett, Is the Supreme Court Too Packed With Ivy Leaguers?, TIME, May 12, 2010, at 28 
(stating that “the Court today has less geographical diversity than it did even when Thomas Jefferson was 
President"). 
12
  See Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning Politicians to the Supreme Court, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1354-58 (2010). 
13
  There is a related concern that the Roberts Court life experiences (outside of race and gender) are less 
diverse than previous Courts.  In a related study, Benjamin H. Barton & Emily Moran, Using Biodiversity 
Statistics to Measure Diversity in Groups of Humans: The Example of Supreme Court Justice Background 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), we use biodiversity statistics to prove that the Roberts 
Court is at least as diverse as prior Supreme Courts in terms of life experiences.  Note that this is not 
inconsistent with a finding that the Roberts Court Justices’ experiences are different from those of prior 
Justices.  Those experiences can be equally diverse, but still different than prior Courts.  
Court from the first to the latest.  The study is the first to take a broad and 
comprehensive look at the annual experiences of the Justices of the Court across 
multiple criteria (geography, education, and work are all considered).14  Counting 
years offers a more nuanced and accurate picture of exactly what Justices have done, 
when, for how long, and allows for clearer apples to apples comparisons among 
different Supreme Courts.  
The dataset considers a large number of factors, including: the years each 
Justice spent in which geographic locations; where and if a Justice went to law 
school; what, if any, undergraduate institutions a Justice attended;15 whether a 
Justice worked in private practice, separating out practice as a solo practitioner, as a 
partner in a small group of lawyers, and work in larger law firms; whether each 
Justice had ever been elected to office (and how long the Justice served in office), 
separating out executive from legislative elections, as well as federal from state; 
how long each Justice worked in a presidential cabinet, taught in a law school, 
served in the military, ran a non-law business, served as a trial or appellate judge in 
either the state or federal judiciary, clerked for a judge or Justice, or served as the 
Solicitor General or Attorney General of the United States.  In sum, the study 
attempts to account for every year of each Justice’s pre-appointment life to track the 
experiences that the Justices brought with them to the Supreme Court over time.   
                                                        
14
  Previous studies have generally relied upon a more binary assessment of experiences, i.e. whether a 
Justice has, or has not, had a particular experience.  See, e.g., Glen, supra note __, at 131-37 (binary on 
education); Epstein, et al., supra note __, at 913-41 (binary except for figure 7 on p. 929).   
15
  Because the study includes all Supreme Court Justices, there are many from the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries who “read the law” and did not attend law school and there are a few who were appointed with no 
formal educational training whatsoever. 
The study reaches some surprising conclusions and offers strong evidence 
that the latest Roberts Court is a relative outlier in comparison to past Supreme 
Courts.  The data suggests that many of the criticisms of justice background are well 
grounded and that as a whole the experiences of the Roberts Court represent a 
substantial departure from previous Supreme Courts.   
 The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I outlines how the study was designed 
and implemented.  Part II details the findings.  Part III discusses some of the 
ramifications of Part II’s findings and suggests a return to prior selection criteria. 
I. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This study details experiences that preceded appointment to the Supreme 
Court for each Justice.  The study attempts to measure these experiences as broadly 
and comprehensively as possible, so educational, geographic, and professional 
experiences are all tracked by years.   
There are thus two assumptions underlying the study – that the experiences 
of the Justices will have an effect on their decision-making and that measuring these 
experiences in terms of time is useful, rather than counting experiences in a binary 
fashion by simply noting whether any Justice has or has not had a particular 
experience. 
The first assumption is intuitively obvious and empirically defensible.  Since 
at least the 1960s, political scientists and others have postulated that the 
backgrounds and experiences of Supreme Court Justices affect their decision-
making.16  Although some empirical studies of Justice background have failed to find 
an effect,17 there are sufficient studies demonstrating an effect to offer empirical 
support to the intuition that background must affect decision-making.18  In 
particular, a series of studies have found that certain occupational experiences – like 
working in academia,19 as a prosecutor,20 as a judge,21 or as a politician22 – do have 
an effect on Supreme Court decision-making.  
                                                        
16
  See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES, 1946-63 (1965) (applying psychological studies of human behavior to Supreme Court 
decision-making); STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969). 
17
  See, e.g., C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: 
Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 359-63 
(1981) (failing to find a relationship between college prestige and civil rights and liberties liberalism); 
Gregory C. Sisk, et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1463-65 (1998) (finding no relationship between elite law school 
education and district judges federal sentencing guidelines constitutionality decisions).  
18
  For an outstanding overview of these studies, see George, supra note __, at 1349-55.   
19
  See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 14 (2001) (demonstrating that academic 
experience was not a proxy for a particular policy preference but that it was associated with greater 
activism on the bench). 
20
  See Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger 
Courts, in CASES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 108-09 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1976) (demonstrating that 
Justices with prosecutorial experience were more pro-prosecution in criminal procedure cases); Tate, supra 
note __, at 359-63 (showing that Justices without prosecutorial experience favored civil liberties claims).  
For a few non-Supreme Court studies, see Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 335-36 (1962) (finding that former prosecutors on state supreme courts 
were pro-prosecution in criminal cases); Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds and 
Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 266 (1974) (showing small pro-prosecution effect for former 
prosecutor judges). 
21
  For a recent example of a study showing the effect of prior judicial experience on Justice decision-
making, see Lee Epstein, et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial Experience Biases the 
Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2009).  Other studies considering the effect of prior judicial 
experience are a bit of a mixed bag.  Compare Tate, supra note __, at 362 (considering 1946 through 1978 
and concluding that Justices with prior judicial experience were more receptive to civil rights and liberties 
claims regardless of their party identification, other experiences, or personal attributes), with Richard E. 
Johnston, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, in CASES IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 71 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1976) (showing the opposite correlation: Justice’s with 
prior judicial experience tended to be conservative on civil liberties), with C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, 
Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-
88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 474-76 (1991) (stating that between 1916 and 1988, prior judicial experience 
showed no effect on civil rights and liberties decisions and a weak relationship to economic rulings). 
22
  See Tate, supra note __, at 359-63 (showing that politician Justices were more liberal on economic 
questions); James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor 
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1681 
(1999) (noting that former politician judges were likelier to support labor unions); Sheldon Goldman, 
Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 501-3 
(1975) (finding that judges with political experience tended to disfavor the government in fiscal cases). 
The second assumption is harder, especially because a purely annual count 
must ignore other important questions of diversity and experience, like religion, 
ethnicity and family background, as those experiences tend to be life long and not 
reducible to a firm set of years.23  These diversity elements were studied, however, 
and will be mentioned, but cannot be easily compared against the other, annualized 
factors.  Nevertheless, the advantage of adding in years is that it allows for 
weighting by time, treating Louis Brandeis’ thirty-nine years of private practice 
differently from Elena Kagan’s two years. 
The study worked from multiple different source materials, but the basic 
structure was as follows.  The first source considered was The Biographical 
Directory of the Federal Judiciary,24 which contains brief biographical sketches of 
every federal judge since 1789, and gives short descriptions of their careers, 
helpfully listed by years.  The study checked this data against an exceptional online 
database of information about every Supreme Court nominee (including those who 
were not confirmed) compiled by Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, 
Scott Hendrickson and Jason Roberts.25  In cases where there were discrepancies 
between the two sources, or neither source answered a question (such as which 
years a Justice spent in which localities as a child) other sources were considered, 
                                                        
23
  The alternative was to assign a number of years of being a woman before becoming a Supreme Court 
Justice to Ruth Bader Ginsburg or to assign a number of years to growing up impoverished in a rural setting 
to the 27th Justice, John Catron.  See Frank O. Gatell, John Catron, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 372-73 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel 
eds.,1997) (hereinafter JUSTICES). 
24
  THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001). 
25
  LEE EPSTEIN, THOMAS G. WALKER, NANCY STAUDT, SCOTT HENDRICKSON & JASON ROBERTS, THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DATABASE (2010), available at 
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/justicesdata.html (hereinafter DATABASE).  The study also 
worked from a less comprehensive print version of similar data, LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD 
J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS (2d. ed. 1996) (hereinafter COMPENDIUM). 
most notably Leon Friedman and Fred Israel’s four volume biography of each 
Justice, The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major 
Opinions.26 
Despite (or perhaps because of) these multiple sources some discrepancies 
were inevitable, especially when measuring years.  Justices, especially Justices from 
the 19th Century, frequently had two jobs at once, making coding for time 
challenging.  It was quite common for lawyer-politicians in the nineteenth to 
practice law while serving as a government official.  For example, the second Justice, 
John Rutledge, practiced law and served as a member of the South Carolina House of 
Commons for thirteen years.27   
Likewise, law teaching often overlapped with private practice.  Justice 
Ginsburg is a recent example, as she worked as the counsel for the ACLU’s Women’s 
Rights Project while she was a law professor at Columbia.28  Humorously, two 
different Supreme Court Justices – Horace Lurton and William Howard Taft – served 
as Deans of a Law School while they also held another presumably time consuming 
job as a Circuit Judge on the United States 6th Circuit.29  Under these circumstances 
the study coded both employments for the full number of years, rather than try to 
divide the years or assign one simultaneous job primacy.30 
                                                        
26
  See JUSTICES, supra note __. 
27
  See COMPENDIUM, supra note __, at 278, 291. 
28
  See Stephanie Goldberg, The Second Woman Justice, ABA J., October, 1993, at 40; Peter J. Rubin, 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Perspective, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 825 (2009). 
29
  See James F. Watts, Jr., Horace H. Lurton, in 3 JUSTICES, supra note __, at 935; Alpheus T. Mason, 
William Howard Taft, in 3 JUSTICES, supra note __, at 1053. 
30
  This option was chosen because it involved the least amount of judgment in terms of coding and thus 
was least likely to inject any bias.  That said, readers should remember that earlier Justices were more 
likely to do two jobs at once when reading the results of this study. 
These sources were boiled down into a short biographical sketch of each 
Justice divided by years.  These years were then divided into studied categories and 
sub-categories as follows:  
1. The Private Practice of Law – Separately lists the years each Justice worked 
in solo practice, as part of a small partnership, in a larger law firm, or as an in 
house corporate or organization lawyer.31  These categories are then 
combined into a single measure of the length of private practice. 
2. Government Lawyer – Separately lists the years each Justice worked as a 
prosecutor, an assistant solicitor general, the Solicitor General, the United 
States Attorney General, the United States Attorney for a district, an Attorney 
General of a state, or other miscellaneous government lawyer work.  These 
categories are combined into a single measure of years spent as a 
government lawyer. 
3. Elected Official – Separately lists the years each Justice spent as the President 
of the United States, as a United States Senator, a United States 
Representative, a member of the Continental Congress, a governor, a state 
legislator, a mayor, or some other local elected position.32  These categories 
are combined into a single measure of years spent as an elected official. 
                                                        
31
  These categories of practice come from DATABASE, supra note __.  There is occasional overlap and 
confusion between the small partnership and law firm categories and the exact dates of work, especially for 
the earlier Justices, can be fuzzy.  See id.  
32
  One of my favorite unusual job experiences is Lewis Powell’s nine years as the Chairman of the 
Richmond, Virginia Public School Board.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A 
BIOGRAPHY 160-66 (2001). 
4. Law Teaching – Separately lists the years each Justice spent as a law school 
instructor, professor or Dean.  These categories are combined into a single 
measure of years spent in law teaching. 
5. Prior Judicial Experience – Separately lists the years each Justice spent as a 
Federal appellate Judge, a Federal trial judge, a state appeals judge, or a state 
trial judge.  These categories are combined into three different aggregate 
measures: total time spent judging, total appellate judging and total trial 
judging. 
6.  Non-law Government Service – Separately lists the years each Justice spent 
in non-law related government service for local governments, state 
governments, and the federal government.  Time spent as the head of a 
cabinet level agency other than the Justice Department in the Federal 
government is separately counted from other federal service.  These 
categories are combined into a single measure of non-law government 
service. 
7. Additional Employment Categories – The study also lists the years each 
Justice spent in the military, working in a private, non-law capacity, and any 
years spent as a law clerk to a federal judge, a state supreme court justice or 
a United States Justice.  
8. Geography – Separately lists each geographic location (either a State or 
foreign country) where a Justice lived from birth until appointment on the 
Supreme Court.  For purposes of adulthood a Justice’s geographic location is 
defined by where they worked, rather than where they lived.33  These 
locations are then grouped into eight categories:34 New England,35 Mid-
Atlantic,36 South,37 Midwest,38 Southwest,39 West,40 Abroad (foreign 
countries),41 and Washington D.C.42   
9. Education – Separately lists the years each Justice spent in undergraduate or 
graduate education.   There are separate categories for total undergraduate 
years and years each Justice spent in undergraduate education at Yale, 
Harvard or Princeton or at another Ivy League institution or Stanford.43  
There are also separate categories for total years in law school, years in law 
school at Yale or Harvard, years spent in another Ivy League law school or 
                                                        
33
  The study codes in this manner because the employment data is readily available, whereas the actual 
domicile data is often unavailable.  This adjustment matters most for Justices who worked in Washington, 
D.C., which is always coded as D.C., rather than attempting to determine if the person actually lived in 
Maryland or Virginia or both while working in D.C.  Insofar as the geographic listing is meant to reflect 
experiences, it would be strange to code Lewis Powell’s years in Richmond, Virginia the same as a Justice 
who lived in a Virginia suburb while serving as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, so this coding decision is 
defensible as a matter of both feasibility and accuracy.  
34
  These categories come from U.S. Embassy, The Regions of the United States, at 
http://usa.usembassy.de/travel-regions.htm (last visited June 1, 2011). 
35
  Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.  See id. 
36
  Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. See id. 
37
  Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.  See id. 
38
  Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota and Wisconsin.  See id. 
39
  Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas.  See id. 
40
  Alaska, Colorado, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington and 
Wyoming.  See id. 
41
  The foreign countries where Justices spent a year or longer, listed alphabetically, are: Austria, England, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Phillipines, Russia, Scotland, Spain and Turkey.  The study 
codes the Philippines as a foreign location, although it was a U.S. Protectorate during the time at issue. 
42
  Washington, D.C. is coded separately, rather than grouped with the mid-Atlantic region because the 
large number of years in D.C. would skew the Mid-Atlantic numbers and because the years spent in D.C. 
are also of interest as a proxy for time spent in and around the seat of the federal government. 
43
  Princeton, Yale and Harvard are listed together as the three most elite American universities historically.  
See Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale and 
Princeton (2006).  The other Ivy League schools are Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth and Penn.  See 
FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 377 (1991).  Stanford is 
included on this list because in the second half of the 20th century it rose to equal prominence to (if not 
eclipsed) the other Ivy League institutions.  See JONATHAN R. COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
117-29 (2009). 
Stanford, years spent in a masters program, years spent studying in a foreign 
country, and years spent “reading the law.”44 
The study assigns a year value (either zero or a whole number) to each of these 
categories for each Justice.  114 Justices were listed, rather than 112, because Chief 
Justices Rutledge and Hughes are counted separately from Associate Justices 
Rutledge and Hughes.  Both Rutledge and Hughes left the Court (and gained new 
experiences before they returned), so they are counted separately both times.45  
The study then grouped the Justices into “natural Supreme Courts,” each 
named sequentially for the Chief Justice.46  Note that these natural Courts do not 
have the same number of Justices.  The first natural court (Jay 1) had only five 
Supreme Court Justices, all of the Courts from 1790-1807 (Jay 2 to Marshall 4) had 
six or fewer Justices, and the Courts from 1863-1870 (Taney 15 and Chase 1) had 
ten Justices.47  Further, some of these Courts existed for relatively short periods and 
others for much longer.  For example, the period without a chief justice in 1796 
following the Senate’s rejection of Justice Rutledge as Chief Justice lasted a little over 
                                                        
44
  During the 19th Century the dominant form of legal education was to “read the law” as an apprentice to a 
lawyer or on one’s own.  See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S 3-10 (1983).  
45
  Rutledge left the Court from 1791-1795 to be the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Court of Common 
Pleas, see MATTHEW P. HARRINGTON, JAY AND ELLSWORTH, THE FIRST COURTS 43-45 (2008).  Hughes left 
the Court to serve as the Republican candidate for President, private practice and service as the Secretary of 
State, among other activities.  See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 
1930-41 5-12 (2007). 
46
  These natural Supreme Courts come from COMPENDIUM, supra note __, at 339-48.  These natural Courts 
begin when a new Justice takes the oath of office and continue until the next new Justice takes the oath.  
When two or more Justices joined the court within a period of fifteen days or fewer it counts as a single 
natural court.  Id. 
47
  See id. at 339-42. 
a month,48 while Rehnquist 6 (Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer) lasted for over eleven years.  The study 
refers to these Supreme Courts by Chief Justice last name and a number (e.g., 
Roberts 4).  The number refers to the particular iteration of a Court within a 
particular Chief Justice.  So the current Court is called Roberts 4, because Chief 
Justice Roberts has presided over three earlier groups of Justices.49 
 The year values for the individual Justices were then aggregated by natural 
court to create a publicly available excel spreadsheet to allow comparisons across 
Supreme Courts.  Thus, the study is able to compare experience among individual 
justices as well as the various natural Supreme Courts.  The four main documents 
underlying the study: the Justices database, the natural Courts database, the key to 
the databases and the narrative version of the Justices’ experiences are all posted on 
line for purposes of transparency.50 
II. FINDINGS 
The study’s findings are divided by category.  In each category charts are 
used to show the prevalence of a particular experience per Justice.  “Per Justice” 
means that the study divides the total years spent in any given activity for all of the 
Justices on any given natural Supreme Court by the number of Justices on that Court.  
Because some natural Courts have had as few as five Justices or as many as ten, a 
                                                        
48
  See id. at 339.  For more on Justice Rutledge’s failed nomination, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, 
PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM 
WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 78 (5th ed. 2008). 
49
  Roberts 1 lasted from September 29, 2005-January 31, 2006 and consisted of Justices Roberts, Stevens, 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer.  Roberts 2 replaced O’Connor with Alito 
and lasted from January 31, 2006-August 8, 2009.  Roberts 3 replaced Souter with Sotomayor and lasted 
from August 8, 2009-August 7, 2010.  Roberts 4 started on August 7, 2010 with Kagan replacing Stevens.  
50
  EDS: we can post these documents at the law review website or on my university site. 
per Justice measure is generally more accurate than the raw tallies by Court.  When 
relevant the study does discuss the cumulative experience by natural Court.  Taken 
together these findings suggest that the experiences of the Roberts Court Justices 
are collectively and individually quite distinct from previous Supreme Courts. 
A. The Private Practice of Law 
The private practice of law has been the single most prevalent and lengthy 
experience of the Supreme Court Justices as a whole.  112 of 114 Supreme Court 
Justices have at least some private practice experience.  Collectively those 112 
Justices spent 1,898 years in the practice of law before joining the Court, almost 
seventeen years per Justice.51  By comparison, the next most prevalent experience is 
671 years as a lower court judge (appellate or district court).   
The private practice of law consists of paid work for clients (either as a solo 
practitioner, a member of a small partnership or a law firm) or work for an 
institutional client, either a corporation or a non-profit.52  The only two Justices in 
the history of the Court with no private practice experience are Justices Breyer and 
Alito.53 
Before turning to the trends per Justice over time, the general employment 
trends are interesting and closely match the overall trend in American legal practice 
from solo practice to small partnerships to working in larger law firms.  The last 
                                                        
51
  From here forward each of the collective and per Justice figures are derived from the spreadsheets 
covering the Justices and the natural Supreme Courts.  These spreadsheets are available on line at ____.  
The narrative claims, such as Justice Roberts worked as an assistant solicitor general or Justice Thurgood 
Marshall worked for the NAACP come from the narrative listing of Justice experiences, available on line at 
______. 
52
  Thus, Justice Ginsburg’s work for the ACLU and Justice Marshall’s work for the NAACP count as 
private practice, but Justice Alito’s work as a United States Attorney does not. 
53
  Note that both Justices Breyer and Alito did practice law as government lawyers. 
Supreme Court Justice to have a solo practice was Thurgood Marshall and the last to 
work in a small partnership was Sandra Day O’Connor.54  Despite these relatively 
late examples, the dominance of the law firm after the 1930s is quite striking.  
Figure 1 is a chart showing years per Justice in four different practice settings: solo, 
small partnership, law firm, and corporate/organizational counsel.  Note that solo 
practice is the dominant form at first, followed by small partnership and eventually 
law firm practice.  Note also the shrinkage in private practice experience as a whole 
since the mid-1970s. 
 
The cumulative total of years in private practice per natural Supreme Court is 
remarkable.  The most recent Roberts Court (Roberts 4) has 54 years total private 
practice experience, the absolute lowest number of combined private practice 
                                                        
54
  There is, of course, another reason why these Justices practiced in a less popular and remunerative 
setting at the outset of their careers: most contemporary law firms would not hire African-Americans or 
women. 
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Fig. 1 - Years per Justice in practice settings
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experience of any Supreme Court, including the five and six Justice Supreme Courts 
of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century.55 
The differences are more marked on a per capita basis.  The four Roberts 
Courts and Rehnquist 6 are the only Supreme Courts with fewer than ten years of 
private practice per Justice.  Charted by time on figure 2, private practice per Justice 
shows a marked downward trend during the Roberts years, with Roberts 4 the 
absolute nadir: 
 
In sum, either as a matter of cumulative experience or per capita time in private 
practice, the Roberts Court is a significant departure from previous Supreme Courts.  
The average Supreme Court Justice had over sixteen years of private practice 
experience and the average Roberts 4 Justice has just six years. 
                                                        
55
  The next lowest number is the “no chief Justice 1796,” five person Court of 1796, which has 58 total 
years.  The other 9 person Courts with low private practice experience are Roberts 2 with 67 years, Roberts 
3 with 73 years, Roberts 1 with 75 years, and Rehnquist 6 with 77 years.  Waite 1, 2, and 3 from 1874-1881 
have three of the four highest totals, along with Hughes 4 (1937-38). 
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Fig. 2 - Years of Private Practice per 
Justice
 In addition, even the time the Roberts 4 Justices spent in private practice is of 
a different kind than the historical trend.  All of the cumulative private practice 
experience on the current Court came as corporate counsel or in law firm practice.  
These practice settings are distinct from solo and small firm practice in several 
ways.  First, large law firms tend to represent corporations or businesses rather 
than individuals.56  Second, large firm practice is characterized by specialization.57  
Lastly, partially because of the overall trend away from trial work, and partially 
because of the expense of trial, large firm lawyers spend much less time in court 
than their solo and small firm predecessors.58  
 Additionally, twenty-one of the collective fifty-four years the study coded as 
private practice experience for the Roberts 4 Justices was spent in particularly 
rarified and Supreme Court heavy legal practices.  John Roberts’ thirteen years at 
the DC office of Hogan and Hartson focused largely on appellate work in the 
Supreme Court.59  Similarly, Justice Ginsburg’s eight years founding and running the 
ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project involved a constitutional law and Supreme Court 
heavy docket.60  Thus, this group of Justices has spent less time in private practice 
                                                        
56
  See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 
MICH. L. REV.  953, 961-63 (2000) (“The largest firms serve almost exclusively corporate clients. The most 
successful, influential, and creative lawyers predominantly (although not exclusively) serve corporate 
clients. The vast majority of elite law school graduates end up serving corporate clients.”). 
57
  See JOHN P. HEINZ, ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 37-38 (2005). 
58
  See Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 35, 36-37 (2006).   
59
  See George W. Bush Whitehouse Archives, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/roberts.html.  Roberts briefed and argued thirty-nine 
Supreme Court cases before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit.  Id. 
60
  See ACLU, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, at 
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (last visited February 
14, 2012). 
than any other, and much of the time they have spent tended to be especially 
focused on constitutional and Supreme Court matters. 
 B. Government Lawyer 
 The study also considered Justice time spent as a government lawyer.  Given 
the dearth of time spent as a private lawyer, practicing in a government setting is a 
possible replacement experience.  As Part III argues, the private practice of law 
offers a particularly valuable set of experiences, but practice as a government 
lawyer may serve some similar purposes.  Nevertheless, while the Roberts Courts do 
run on the high end for experience as government lawyers, these years of 
experience do not fully counter-balance the relative lack of private practice 
experience.  As demonstrated below, the Roberts Court Justices are on the very low 
end of the total amount of time spent in practice.  
Time spent as a lawyer for the government, either federal or state, has 
historically been less common than private practice, measured in terms of total 
years or by individual Justices.  While the Roberts Court ranks relatively high on this 
measure (both Roberts 2 with 52 total years and Roberts 4 with 49 years are in the 
top 15 Courts for service as a government lawyer, at eighth and thirteenth 
respectively), the Roberts Courts are not clustered at the very top or bottom of this 
scale, as they are for private practice, political experience, law teaching or time 
judging.  The 1940s and 1950s were the high water mark for time spent as a 
government lawyer, with the first Warren Court, serving from 1953-55, topping the 
list with 78 total years.61   
                                                        
61
  Note that this was still well below the 112 years of total private practice for Warren 1.   
The trend can be seen in figure 3’s graph of the Justices’ per capita years 
spent as a government lawyer:62 
 
Note that in the Roberts Court the years as a government lawyer are almost equal to 
the amount of time spent in private practice, a significant departure from previous 
Courts.  Figure 4 shows the two per Justice lines almost converging with Roberts 4. 
                                                        
62
  Note the difference in scale on the vertical access between Figures 1 and 2 (0-30 years per Justice) and 
Figure 3 (0-10 years per Justice).  The scales are different because private practice has been much more 
common than service as a government lawyer. 
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Fig. 3 - Years as a Government Lawyer per 
Justice
 The Roberts 4 Court’s government lawyering experience, like its private 
practice experience, is also weighted towards particularly elite and Supreme Court 
heavy work.  The Roberts 4 Court has a total of forty-nine years spent as a 
government lawyer.  Nine of those years were spent in the Solicitor General’s office, 
which carries a completely appellate docket,63 and another twelve was spent in 
specialized work for the President or the Senate.64  The balance was spent in the 
more typical U.S. Attorney General’s office or as a state prosecutor.  Taken with the 
                                                        
63
  Justices Alito and Roberts each worked as assistant U.S. Solicitor Generals for four years and Justice 
Kagan was the U.S. Solicitor General for a year before coming on the Court.  For a description of the 
history and role of the Office of the Solicitor General, see REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR 
GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW (1992).  The Solicitor General’s Office was not established until 1870, so 
obviously no Justices worked there before that date.  Id. at 2-3.  Five Justices served as the Solicitor 
General: William Howard Taft, Stanley Forman Reed, Robert Jackson, Thurgood Marshall and Elena 
Kagan.  Only two Justices have ever served as assistant Solicitor Generals: Justices Alito and Roberts. 
64
  The government lawyering that fits this description is as follows.  Justice Scalia spent one year as the 
General counsel, Office of Telecommunications Policy, Executive Office of the President.  Justice Breyer 
spent three years serving as an Assistant Special Prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force, as a 
Special Counsel for the Administrative Practices Subcommittee, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, and as 
the Chief Counsel for U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee.  Justice Roberts spent four years as an Associate 
Counsel to the President, White House Counsel's Office.  Elena Kagan spent four years as a Special 
Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, as the Associate Counsel to the President, and as the Deputy 
Assistant for Domestic Policy and Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council. 
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practice per justice
private practice experience, almost half of the Roberts 4 Court’s lawyering 
experience focused on the Supreme Court or high-level policymaking, not trial 
practice or traditional lawyering. 
C. Total Practice 
Adding the years as a government lawyer with the private practice years to 
create a total measure of practice experience shows that the Roberts Courts do have 
a historical precedent in the Marshall Courts of the early 19th century.  Marshall 7 
(1824-1826) is the only Court with under ten years total practice experience per 
Justice, with the other late Marshall Courts showing similar numbers.  The current 
Roberts Court is the fourth lowest of all time at 11.5 years of total practice per 
Justice.  
A bookended trend towards shorter periods of practicing law in the first 
Supreme Courts and the most recent Courts can be seen in figure 5: 
  D. Elected Official 
 One of the great surprises from studying the pre-appointment experience for 
Supreme Court Justices is the sheer amount of time prior Justices spent as non-
lawyer, elected officials.65  The only two categories that surpass elected office are 
time spent in private practice and experience as a judge, counting trial and appellate 
experience together.  Collectively, Supreme Court Justices spent 500 total years as 
elected officials; more than the 429 years they spent as appellate judges.  Given the 
current Court’s zero years spent in elected office and 74 years spent on an appellate 
bench, the Roberts Courts are quite anomalous.  
                                                        
65
  This count does not include time as an elected judge or elected attorney general.  Only stints as an 
elected state or federal legislator or executive are tallied. 
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Fig. 5 - Total Practice Years per Justice
 This service is impressive for the offices held, the variation, and the sheer 
amount of time.  Supreme Court Justices have served as the President of the United 
States, governors of multiple states, and mayors.  Fourteen different Justices have 
been Senators and seventeen have been U.S. Representatives.   
 There are only three Supreme Courts where a not a single Justice has served 
in an elected office: Roberts 2, Roberts 3, and Roberts 4.66  The trend away from 
elected office as an experience for Supreme Court Justices has been marked since 
the Burger Courts, but has accelerated recently.  The first nineteenth century Court 
with relatively limited elected experience is Waite 6, serving from 1882-1886 and 
carrying a total of just 12 years of elected experience. 
 Figure 6 shows how the per Justice years in elected office have fallen 
precipitously in recent years: 
 
                                                        
66
  The retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor ended a continuous tradition of at least one former 
politician on every Supreme Court from Jay 1 forward. 
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Fig. 6 - Elected Office per Justice
 E. Law Teaching 
 What the Roberts Court lacks in practice experience it makes up in law 
teaching.  With 95 collective years in legal academia, Roberts 4 is again first among 
all Supreme Courts in years spent in legal academia.  Interestingly, the gap is not as 
large as some other categories; two Courts from the 1940s (Hughes 8 and Stone 2) 
are just behind with 94 total years.67  Unsurprisingly, given the rarity of law school 
training in the 19th century, most Supreme Courts during that period have no law 
teaching experience.68 
 Figure 7 shows a long period where no Justices had any experience teaching, 
followed by two relative peaks: 
                                                        
67
  Hughes 8 (Justices Hughes, McReynolds, Stone, Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and 
Murphy, February 5, 1940-July 3, 1941) and Stone 2 (Justices Stone, Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, 
Douglas, Murphy, R. Jackson, and W. Rutledge, February 15, 1943-October 1, 1945) included several 
Justices with extensive law teaching experience.  Harlan Stone (Professor and Dean at Columbia), Owen 
Roberts (professor at Penn), Felix Frankfurter (professor at Harvard), William Douglas (professor at 
Columbia and Yale), and Wiley Rutledge (professor and Dean at Colorado, Washington University, and 
Iowa) were all long-time academics.  In addition, James McReynolds (Vanderbilt), Charles Evan Hughes 
(Cornell and NYU), and James Murphy (University of Detroit) all taught law for a period of their careers.  
68
  This study only measures experience from before joining the Court.  As such, Justice Story’s long 
service as an instructor at Harvard while he was a Justice was not counted.  See R. KENT NEWMYER, 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 237-70 (1985). 
 The experience in law teaching helps explain why the Roberts 4 Court is relatively 
low in practice or elected experience.  Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and 
Kagan spent much of their pre-Court careers in academia. 
F. Total Judicial Service 
Like elected service before the retirement of Justice O’Connor, every 
Supreme Court has had at least one Justice with some prior judicial experience.  This 
first measure of judicial service combines any and all judicial service, including state 
and federal, trial and appellate.  This experience runs from the least – two total 
years experience for Hughes 6 and 7, 1939-4069 – to the most – Fuller 5 (1893-
1894), with ninety-one total years.  Surprisingly, given the criticism of the current 
practice of appointing former U.S. Circuit Court Judges to the Court, the Roberts 
                                                        
69
 Hughes 6 was Justices Hughes, McReynolds, Brandeis, Butler, Stone, Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter 
and Hughes 7 subtracted Brandeis and added Douglass.  Of these Justices only Justice Black had any 
judicial experience, two years as a police court judge in Birmingham, Alabama.  See HOWARD BALL, HUGO 
L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 5, 13 (1996).  The Hughes 6 and 7 Courts, like the Roberts Courts, were 
relative outliers experience-wise. 
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Fig. 7 - Law Teaching per Justice
Court is not at the highest end of prior judicial service.  On this measure Roberts 3 
(eighty-six years total judicial experience) and Roberts 4 (eighty-one years) are in 
the top 10, but the bulk of the top 10 and the top 3 are all from the Fuller Courts at 
the turn of the 20th Century.   
Figure 8 – total judicial experience per Justice – shows that the first Supreme 
Court actually had the most prior judicial experience per Justice:  
 
The chart shows three distinct periods where judicial experience dipped on 
the Supreme Court, with the early 1940s a clear low point.  On a per Justice basis the 
Roberts Courts are one of three distinct peaks, and lower than the highs of Jay 1 and 
the Fuller Courts. 
G. Trial and Appellate Judging Considered Separately 
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Fig. 8 - Total Judicial Experience per Justice
If you disaggregate trial and appellate judicial experience, however, the 
Roberts Courts’ lengthy experience as appellate judges stands out more clearly.  The 
Roberts Courts are four of the top six in cumulative total years in appellate judging.  
Roberts 2 and Roberts 3 are first and second, with eighty and seventy-nine total 
years as appellate judges respectively.  In fact, while commentators have noted the 
rise of the federal appellate judgeship in the last fifty years, the trend lines also 
show the move away from trial court experience.  Figure 9 shows both trial and 
appellate experience. 
 
Trial Judge experience has shown a relatively steady decline since the heights of the 
early Supreme Courts, while appellate experience has waxed and waned more 
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extremely.70  The Roberts Court has the highest per Justice appellate experience, but 
the Courts of the early 20th century are close behind.   
 H. Miscellaneous Employment Categories 
 The five categories considered above are the five biggest sources of pre-
Court professional experience, but there are three additional, less prevalent 
categories worth mentioning: non-law government service, military service, and 
non-law private employment. 
  1. Non-Law Government Service 
 Many Supreme Court Justices have some experience as government 
employees in jobs that do not involve much, if any legal practice.  Various levels of 
jobs from under-secretaries to cabinet level positions were coded as non-law 
government service.  For example, Justice Thomas worked as a legislative assistant 
to then U.S. Senator John Danforth, the assistant secretary for civil rights at the 
Department of Education, and then the chairman of the EEOC across eleven years.  
Each of these experiences is counted as non-law government service, because these 
jobs (unlike working as an assistant U.S. Attorney or in the white house counsel’s 
office) do not require a law degree.   
Non-law government service was less common historically.  The Roberts 4 
Court is above the median, but still in the middle with 14 cumulative years and 
approximately 1.5 years per Justice.  Figure 10 shows that this experience ran high 
                                                        
70
  Congress did not create the federal courts of appeals until 1891, so all of the pre-1891 appellate 
experience came from state appellate courts.  See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 
Stat. 826.  
for the first fifty or so years of the Supreme Court71 and has remained relatively 
lower since: 
 
  2.  Military Service 
 The amount of military service on various Supreme Courts tends to rise and 
fall depending on the wars America fought over the years, as well as the depth of 
population-wide participation.  For example, most Justices who were of fighting age 
during the Revolutionary War and World War II appear to have fought, as shown by 
the spike in judicial military experience following those wars, while the veterans of 
other wars were less prevalent on the Court.72    
                                                        
71
  The absolute peak of 7.5 years of non-law government service per Justice was from Marshall 5 (which 
sat from 1811-12). 
72
  In reading Figure 11 please note the difference in scale on the vertical access.  The bulk of the previous 
charts have run from 0-10 years per Justice and this Figure spans 0-3 years per Justice. 
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Fig. 10 - Non-Law Service per Justice
 Roberts 4 has relatively little military experience (Justices Breyer and Kennedy each 
have one year of experience), but there are several Courts with no military 
experience, including Jay 1 from 1789, the three Courts from 1870-1874 (Chase 2, 3 
and Waite 1) and Hughes 3 from 1932-37. 
  3.  Private Enterprise 
 While a relatively rare category of experience, there are twelve Justices who 
worked in a private, non-law enterprise for some period of time before joining the 
Court.  This experience varies quite widely, from James Wilson’s ten years as a 
businessman and land speculator in Philadelphia to Byron White’s years as a 
professional football player for the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Detroit Lions.  Five 
Justices ran nineteenth and early twentieth century newspapers.73  Justice Lucius 
                                                        
73
  Justice John McLean was the founder and editor of The Western Star, Lebanon, Ohio from 1807-1812.  
John McLean and the Western Star, at http://www.historiclebanonohio.com/?q=mclean (last visited June 1, 
2011).  The Western Star is still in publication. See THE WESTERN STAR, at http://www.western-star.com/ 
(last visited June 1, 2011).  Justice Henry Baldwin was the publisher of The Tree of Liberty a Republican 
newspaper in Pittsburgh.  See TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY 83 (2001).  The Tree of Liberty is no longer in publication, although a spurious newspaper 
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Q.C. Lamar was the President of the University of Mississippi and Joseph Lamar was 
a professor of Latin at Bethany College.  The twelve Justices with non-law 
experience were spread out over time, so that more than half of all the historical 
Supreme Courts have at least one Justice with some such experience.  No Justice has 
had any private, non-law experience since Byron White’s retirement in 1993. 
 J. Geography 
 The study measures the years each Supreme Court Justice spent in any state 
or foreign country.74  For ease of use the study aggregates the states into different 
geographic areas of the country and a category for foreign countries.75  Without 
aggregating the data there are some interesting trends.   
 Each nomination by the President to the Senate has included an official home 
state for the nominee,76 and these alone show some noteworthy results.  
Unsurprisingly given the historical context, the two most prevalent official home 
states are New York and Massachusetts.  New York’s overall lead is somewhat 
surprising, however.  Out of one hundred and fourteen Justices considered, sixteen 
listed New York as their home state.  Massachusetts is second with ten Justices, a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
based upon Grand Theft Auto entitled “The Liberty Tree” was created in 2001.  See Liberty Tree, at 
http://www.rockstargames.com/libertytree/ (last visited June 1, 2011).   
 
Justice Stanley Matthews was the editor of the Tennessee Democrat in Maury County, Tennessee.  See D. 
GRIER STEPHENSON, THE WAITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 123 (2003).  Melville Fuller 
was the editor of the Augusta Age, in Augusta Maine.  See JAMES W. ELY, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF 
MELVILLE W. FULLER 5 (1995).  James Byrnes edited the Aiken Journal and Review, in Aiken, South 
Carolina.  ROBERT SOBEL, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH 54 
(1990). 
74
  Only full years of experience are counted and for some of the Justices the years of their childhood are 
somewhat fuzzy.  For example, John McLean’s years of childhood were split between New Jersey, 
Virginia, Kentucky and Ohio without any clear record of when he lived in which state.  See TIMOTHY S. 
HUEBNER, THE TANEY COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 51 (2003). 
75
  The categories are New England, Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest, West, foreign countries, 
and Washington D.C.  These categories are described further supra notes __ and accompanying text.  
76
  See DATABASE, supra note __, at 93. 
substantial gap that reflects New York’s dominance as the historic legal and 
commercial center of the United States.77   
 The rest of the top ten includes some surprises.  Ohio has nine Justices, 
Virginia eight, Pennsylvania and Tennessee six each, and Kentucky, Maryland and 
New Jersey five each.  Virginia’s standing as the fourth state for placing Supreme 
Court Justices behind Ohio is rather surprising,78 given Virginia’s relative dominance 
politically and economically post-revolution and into the early nineteenth century 
and Ohio’s comparative stature as a frontier during that time period.79  Tennessee 
and Kentucky were also relative frontier states in the first half of the nineteenth 
century,80 so their representation on the Court seems unlikely, especially in 
comparison to the relative paucity of Justices from the non-Virginia original 
southern states – North Carolina (2), South Carolina (3), and Georgia (4).  Two other 
original states, Delaware and Rhode Island, have never had a Justice.  Other 
                                                        
77
  See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 80 (1994) (stating that following the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 into the late-nineteenth 
century New York City was “the dominant force in American economic life” and “a center for legal 
work”); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988) (“Though New York was not the only city in which large law 
firms emerged around the turn of the [twentieth] century, it did have the greatest concentration of them, 
reflecting its position as the nation’s financial and commercial center.”). 
78
  Of course students of presidential history will note that Ohio and Virginia have a spirited debate over 
which state has been the “home” state to more U.S. Presidents as well, see Home to More Presidents: Ohio 
or Va.?, available at http://www.factcheck.org/2008/02/home-to-more-presidents-ohio-or-virginia/ (last 
visited January 2, 2012), so maybe Ohio has punched above its weight in two of the three branches. 
79
  Compare KEVIN R. GUTZMAN, VIRGINIA’S AMERICAN REVOLUTION: FROM DOMINION TO REPUBLIC, 
1776-1840 (2009) 163-97 (describing Virginia’s fall from political and economic dominance in the early-
nineteenth century), with R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE OHIO FRONTIER: CRUCIBLE OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 
1720-1830 (1998) (discussing the frontier period of Ohio history). 
80
  For a history of Tennessee’s frontier period, see JOHN R. FINGER, TENNESSEE’S FRONTIERS: THREE 
REGIONS IN TRANSITION (2001).  For Kentucky, see OTIS K. RICE. FRONTIER KENTUCKY (1993). 
surprisingly underrepresented states include Texas with one Justice, and Florida, 
Oregon, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin with none.81    
 Tallied by years these geographic trends are more pronounced, because 
many Justices who do not claim New York or Massachusetts as their home state for 
nomination purposes have spent a chunk of time in those states, for work or 
education.82  The Justices have spent a total of 793 years in New York State and 522 
in Massachusetts, the two highest numbers.83  The next longest stay in any single 
jurisdiction is Washington, D.C. with 468 collective years.  No Justice was born or 
grew up in Washington D.C., so that collective time all results from time spent 
working in the federal government, generally as a politician, a lawyer, or a judge.  
 The Justices have spent the most time in the mid-Atlantic,84 with the South a 
close second.85  Adding regions together suggests the dominance of the Northeast 
and the east coast in the lives of the Justices.  If we aggregate to create a Northeast 
measure (a combination of New England, the Mid-Atlantic and Washington D.C.) the 
Justices spent almost half of their lives in that region.  If we aggregate the east coast 
states (states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean) the Justices spent over half of their 
                                                        
81
  The other states with no Justices are less surprising: Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia and the District 
of Columbia.  
82
  Harvard, Yale and Princeton are a relative boon to Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey.   
83
  From 1789 to the present every Court but six (the six Courts of 1795-1807) has had at least one Justice 
who has spent a year or more in New York.  Likewise, only Marshall 5 (November 23, 1811-February 3, 
1812) and five of the late-Taney Courts from 1845-62 did not include any Justices who had lived in 
Massachusetts. 
84
 1625 collective years without Washington D.C., and 2093 with D.C. included. 
85
  1501 collective years spent in the South. 
pre-Court lives in those states.86  The Justices have spent a relatively short amount 
of time west of the Mississippi and almost no time in the Southwest.87 
 The following charts show the geographic tendencies.  First, Figure 12 shows 
the recent uptick of time spent in DC,88 with Roberts 4 a high point: 
 
 Figure 13 shows the time spent in New England and the Mid Atlantic (not 
including DC) on one chart.89  Although the DC chart shows some volatility, the 
remaining geographic charts really fluctuate a lot depending on the addition or 
subtraction of individual Justices from the Court.  For instance, the last three Justices 
appointed (Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan) had all spent significant time in either New 
York or New Jersey, so the Mid-Atlantic count spikes since 2006.  Likewise, the 
                                                        
86
  The non east coast states that have the longest stays are Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee. 
87
  Collectively the Justices have spent more time living in foreign countries than in the Southwest. 
88
  Note that the early “0” years per Justice on the graph is a little deceiving, since Washington, DC did not 
become the capital until 1800. 
89
  Because of the variability in the per Justice numbers only two datasets are combined on the next two 
charts.  More than two datasets are very hard to read. 
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Fig. 12 - Years in DC per Justice
retirement of Souter dented the New England count, although the collective time 
spent at Yale and Harvard, plus Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan’s long New England 
experience, has kept New England afloat.  Here is New England and Mid Atlantic: 
 
 Figure 14 shows the South and Midwest.  First and unsurprisingly, there are 
no Midwest years until the appointment of Ohioan John McLean in 1830.  Second, 
note the relative prevalence of southern Justices from 1789 until 1949.90  From 
1949-55 the Southerners Rutledge, Vinson, and Jackson died in office and were 
                                                        
90
  1946-49 marked a modern highpoint for Southern geographic experience with the replacement of Harlan 
Stone (who was primarily a New Yorker and New Englander) with the Kentucky native Frederick Vinson.  
The other Justices with Southern experience on the Vinson 1 and Vinson 2 Courts were Alabama native 
Hugo Black, Kentucky native Stanley Reed, and Wiley Rutledge, who grew up in the South.  1949 saw 
Tom Clark replace the Midwesterner Frank Murphy.  Clark is not coded as a southerner, but as the only 
Texan to serve on the Supreme Court his years, plus the other Vinson 1 Justices created a relatively strong 
southern flavor to the Court. 
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replaced by non-southerners Minton, Warren, and the second Justice Harlan and the 
South has been less prevalent since.91   
 
 Figure 15 displays the remaining categories: years per Justice in the 
Southwest, West, and foreign countries.  The foreign line is highest during the 
periods where Justices had grown up in a foreign country.  The five Justice, no Chief 
Justice group from 1796, and the six Justice Jay 2 Court of 1790-92, are the two 
Courts with the most foreign experience.  Justices Wilson, Paterson and Iredell were 
                                                        
91
  Justice Minton had spent 3 years practicing in Miami from 1925-28, but spent the great bulk of his life in 
Indiana.  Neither Warren nor Harlan had any Southern experience.   
 
The prevalence of southern Justices in the post-Civil War period is surprising.  As noted in Part I, tying 
case results to non-ideological experiential factors has been challenging, but the prevalence of southerners 
on the Court before the 1950s may help explain Plessy v. Ferguson and the many other Court cases 
upholding Jim Crow and separate but equal.  It is worth noting, however, that the first, tentative steps in 
dismantling segregation were taken under the late Stone and early Vinson Courts that were relatively 
southerner heavy.  See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Brown’s Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1486-87 (1994) 
(arguing that “in a series of cases involving such matters as voting rights, interstate transportation, and 
graduate school education,” from 1944-54 the Court “gave clear indications that it disapproved of Southern 
segregation practices”).   
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born overseas and Justices Jay, Blair and John Rutledge each spent a short period 
overseas working or studying law.  While the foreign years have lessened it is 
noteworthy that at least one Justice has at least one year overseas for the great 
majority of the Court’s existence.  In contrast, Western Justices were unknown until 
the appointment of the Californian Stephen Field in 186392 and the Southwest does 
not appear until the appointment of Wiley Rutledge in 1943.93 
  
 The two most prevalent geographic areas on the Roberts 4 Court are mid-
Atlantic, Washington, DC and West, although all of the Justices have spent at least a 
few years in New England, the only such region on the current Court.  Roberts 4 
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  Field was born in Connecticut and raised mostly in Massachusetts, but spent the bulk of his adult life 
and career in California.  California had only been a state for 13 years when President Lincoln appointed 
Field. 
93
  Rutledge spent three years of young adulthood in New Mexico and six years in Colorado attending law 
school, practicing, and beginning his career as a legal academic. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
Fig. 15 - Southwest, West, and Foreign per 
Justice
Southwest per Justice
West per Justice
Foreign per Justice
shows increases in Washington, DC and mid-Atlantic and a decline in the other 
areas.  The most notable feature of the Roberts 4, is the time spent working in 
Washington D.C., where the current Court is at a high water mark. 
 J. Education 
 Educational experience mirrors the changes in the educational paths of 
lawyers in America.  For instance, every Justice appointed from 1789-1899 except 
two spent some period of years “reading the law.”94  From the twentieth century 
forward this became much less common.  Likewise, eleven different nineteenth 
century Justices (and one twentieth century Justice) had no formal undergraduate 
or graduate education whatsoever, just a period reading law.95  Three twentieth 
century Justices have only a law school education and no undergraduate studies.96  
Figure 16 illustrates the relative years in undergraduate education, law school, and 
reading the law per Justice: 
                                                        
94
  There were 58 Justices during this period (counting Rutledge twice).  The only two Justices who did not 
read the law were John Blair (1790-1796), who studied law at the Middle Temple in London (which could 
be coded as reading the law, but was coded as law school) and Benjamin Curtis (1851-1857), who was 
educated at Harvard Law School.  The first Justice of the twentieth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes, did 
not read the law and was educated at Harvard Law School.  In this, and other ways, Holmes was a sign of 
things to come in the twentieth century.   
95
  The eleven from the nineteenth century are: James Iredell, Samuel Chase, Alfred Moore, John Marshall, 
Gabriel Duvall, John McLean, John Catron, John McKinley, Nathan Clifford, Noah Swayne, and Rufus 
Peckham.   
 
James F. Byrnes is the lone twentieth century example.  Byrnes was, of course, a remarkable man in most 
every respect.  In the course of his career he served as a U.S. Representative, a Senator, the Governor of 
South Carolina, a Supreme Court Justice, Chairman of the U.S. War Mobilization Board during World War 
II and the Secretary of State immediately following World War II. 
96
  These are Robert Jackson, Sherman Minton, and Charles Whittaker. 
 The current educational formula of four years of undergraduate and three years of 
law school education per Justice is actually of relatively recent vintage, as 
demonstrated by the various educational routes to the Supreme Court over the 
years.  The first year when every Justice had four years of undergraduate work and 
three years of law school was 1986, when Justice Scalia replaced Chief Justice 
Burger.97 
 Nevertheless, recent Supreme Courts have not only completed the maximum 
amount of possible education, their education has grown increasingly elite.  For 
example, a count of total years spent in undergraduate or law school education at 
either Stanford or an Ivy League institution shows that the Roberts 4 Court is first 
by a substantial margin with fifty-five total years.  Notably, this trend started in the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts.  The first non-Roberts, Rehnquist or Burger Court on 
                                                        
97
  Chief Justice Burger spent three years getting a law degree at St. Paul College of Law and two in 
undergraduate (without earning a degree). 
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this ranking of elite education is the Hughes 5 Court (1938-39) with twenty-eight 
years of combined elite education. 
 Figure 17 separates out elite undergraduate and law school educations.  It 
demonstrates graphically the rise of elite undergraduate education (counting ivy 
league institutions and Stanford) and the Yale and Harvard Law Schools. 
 
Although there is one other high point in the early nineteenth century for elite 
undergraduate education,98 the Roberts 4 Court is far and away first in time spent at 
the most elite American undergraduate institutions and law schools. 
K. Summary 
The Roberts 4 Court is the apogee of a number of Supreme Court selection 
trends.  Counting Justice backgrounds by the number of years each Justice spent on 
an activity or in a location leads to a rather startling picture of the current Supreme 
                                                        
98
  The Taney 1 Court (1836) featured Harvard educated Joseph Story, Princeton (then called the College of 
New Jersey) educated Smith Thompson and James Wayne, and Yale educated Henry Baldwin.  The other 
two Justices, Roger Taney and John McLean, read law and did not attend any undergraduate institution. 
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Court.  The Roberts 4 Court spent less time in private practice than any previous 
Supreme Court.  The Justices of the Roberts 4 Court spent almost as much time as 
government lawyers as they have in the private practice of law, another first for any 
Court.99  The Justices of Roberts 2, 3 and 4 have the least collective experience in 
elected office and are the first Court to lack any Justice with experience as an elected 
official.  The Roberts Courts are also on the low end of trial judging experience. 
Much of this lost experiential time can be found in legal academia.  The 
Justices of the Roberts 4 have spent more time in legal academia than any other 
Supreme Court, although two Courts of the 1940s are close.   
Much of the rest of the time has been spent in appellate judging.  Roberts 2 
and 3 are the two Supreme Courts with the most time spent in appellate judging.  
Roberts 2 and 3 are not first in total years judging, however, the combination of trial 
and appellate judging on some previous Courts has been higher.   
Partially because of all of the combined years on the DC Circuit and in 
government lawyering the Roberts 4 Court has spent more years in Washington D.C. 
than any other Supreme Court.  Lastly, the Roberts 4 Court has spent more time in 
elite undergraduate institutions and law schools than any other Court. 
Thus, the trend towards law teaching and appellate judging, and away from 
the private practice of law, elected office and serving as a trial judge have all reached 
peaks or valleys in the Roberts Courts.  These trends are empirically demonstrable 
and irrefutable.  The harder question is whether they are salutary or insalubrious, a 
question we turn to next. 
                                                        
99
  This additional government experience means that the Roberts Court does not have the least time 
practicing law of any Court.  See Figure __, supra. 
III. A BRIEF, NORMATIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ELITE MAKE-UP OF THE CURRENT COURT 
This Part builds off of the empirical analysis to make a normative case that 
that the collective past experiences of the current Court is not optimal given what 
the Court actually does.  This section is not empirical and many can and will 
disagree with its conclusions.  At heart, the question of whether the changes in 
Justice background have been good or bad likely depends on one’s view of the 
quality of the work of the current Court and one’s impression of the current Court’s 
brand of elitism/meritocracy, and those questions do not lend themselves to 
empirical answers.    
Nevertheless, it is demonstrable that the Justices themselves come from 
different backgrounds and that the current Court is operating differently than 
previous Courts have.  The final conclusion – that these two phenomena are related 
and regretful – requires some additional persuasion.  Part I.A discusses the 
collective backgrounds of the current Justices and argues that they are a uniquely 
elite and cloistered group of Justices.  Part I.B describes the role of the current Court 
and argues that it is now largely a policy making body, not a court of appeals 
correcting errors and applying narrow legal principles.  Part I.C argues that the role 
of the Court and the nature of the Justices are heading in opposite directions: a 
policy-making Court needs Justices with real life experience, individuals who have 
faced the hurly burly of legal practice or politics or trial court judging to understand 
the ramifications of broad social policy.  Individuals with more multivariate life 
experience may also be less likely to default to complex legalism in deciding cases 
and writing opinions, a serious problem with the current Court. 
A.   The New Judicial Elite – Cloistered and Neutral 
It is empirically demonstrable that the background experiences of Supreme 
Court Justices have changed over time and that the current group of Supreme Court 
Justices is relatively unique.  This part argues that the current Court exemplifies a 
certain way of thinking about judicial meritocracy and elitism.   
First consider the more prevalent experiences on the Roberts 4 Court – these 
Justices have spent more time in cloistered and neutral work settings than any 
previous group of Justices.  Cloistered and neutral means settings where a lawyer is 
kept out of the fray and encouraged to think about legal problems (and life) in the 
abstract.   
These Justices have spent more time in appellate judging and legal academia 
than prior Justices.  These jobs share much in common.  Both jobs are notoriously 
and proudly independent.100  Both jobs deal with law in an abstract manner.101  
Neither job involves much contact with the public at large.  Both law professors and 
appellate judges tend to encounter litigants on the written page – judges in the fact 
sections of briefs and professors in the fact sections of the cases they teach.  Both 
jobs are closely associated with law students or recent law school graduates (in 
their role as judicial law clerks). 
Both jobs are very hard to get and require a high level of technical excellence 
in legal reasoning.  I have written elsewhere about how judges and Justices are often 
                                                        
100
  Compare the various mechanics of judicial independence, see, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Independence 
and Accountability Symposium, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1999) (discussing judicial independence), with the 
legal academic’s distaste for “advocacy scholarship.”  MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: 
HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 208 (1996). 
101
  Consider Judge John Noonan’s excellent comparison between the professions on this point.  See John 
T. Noonan, Jr., Hercules and the Snail Darter, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1986, § 7, at 13. 
selected based upon their mastery of legal analysis and complexity,102 and the 
import placed upon analytical legal reasoning is even higher in the law 
professoriate.103   
Perhaps unsurprisingly given their work post-law school, the Roberts 4 
Justices are particularly elite educationally.  No Supreme Court has spent more time 
studying at the very best of the best of American educational institutions (ivy league 
or Stanford for undergrad and Harvard or Yale for law school).  These experiences 
reflect a particular type of achievement and another heavy dose of the ivory tower. 
The Roberts 4 Court has spent more time living in Washington D.C. than any 
previous Court.  This shows a deep involvement with both the federal government 
and the Supreme Court before becoming Justices.  Insofar as there is truth to an 
“inside the beltway” mentality,104 the Roberts 4 Court would likely reflect it. 
The Roberts 4 Justices also probably know more about the workings, output, 
and nature of the Supreme Court than any other group of Justices.  Many of the 
Justices have spent a lifetime studying the Court as law professors or working at the 
Court as clerks or practicing before it as lawyers.105 
Consider what experiences are missing.  This Court is historically short in 
three previously well-represented categories of experience – the private practice of 
                                                        
102
  BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 259-83 (2011). 
103
  See, e.g., Leland Ware, People of Color in the Academy: Patterns of Discrimination in Faculty Hiring 
and Retention, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 55, 61-62 (2000) (describing the traditional hiring criteria for 
law professors); Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary 
Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 432-33 (1986) (same). 
104
  See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, et al., Should We Dispense With the Electoral College?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 10, 22 (2007), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/electoral_college.pdf 
(describing and decrying the inside-the-beltway mentality).  
University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra 2007  
105
  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
law, serving as an elected politician, and trial judging.  The time these Justices have 
spent in the practice of law, moreover, is clustered in appellate-heavy work or 
highly-politicized work in the White House Counsel’s Office or for Congress, with 
little time spent in the more traditional litigation or transactional practices of law.106   
Thus, the experiences of the Roberts Court Justices evince a focus upon high-
level legal reasoning, experience in appellate judging, experience in jobs that are 
especially independent and “neutral,” and a special kind of meritocracy/elitism at 
play.  These Justices have less experience with the operation of the legal system 
below the theoretical/appellate level and less “real life” experiences of the give and 
take of conflict, advocacy, and compromise.   
B.   What the Court Does - The Supreme Court is a Political Court 
The Court has naturally morphed from its inception to today, but recent 
years have marked a particularly substantial change.  Over time the Court’s caseload 
has shrunk,107 while the size of its potential certiorari pool has grown.108  This 
means the Court is deciding fewer cases as an absolute number and as a percentage 
of petitions.   
                                                        
106
  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
107
  During the 1970s and 1980s the Court’s caseload hovered around 170 cases per term.  Since the 1990s 
that number has settled around ninety cases per term.  See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Solicitor 
General's Changing Role In Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1339-40 (2010).  For one 
explanation of why, see Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary 
Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 737-94 (2001).  
108
  POSNER, supra note __, at 269-70.  For a description of the collapse in the number of certiorari 
petitions granted as an absolute and relative number, see Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its 
Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006); Kevin H. 
Smith, Certiorari and The Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 729 & n. 
9 (2001). 
As a consequence, the Court limits itself to cases of national impact: cases 
where it can announce broad rules or decide critical constitutional issues.109  While 
the overall percentage of constitutional cases in the Court’s docket has not risen,110 
the salience of those decisions (and the public backlash) certainly has grown since 
the 1950s.111 
The Supreme Court makes politically freighted decisions at every level of 
case review.  The decision to rarely grant review itself is politically loaded.  The 
Court has essentially limited its own power by choosing to address fewer cases. 
Commentators have speculated about the reasons, ranging from a desire “to reduce 
the role of the judiciary in the nation's political life,”112 changes in the Court’s 
mandatory jurisdiction,113 the power of the court clerks in the process,114 advanced 
age,115 or sloth.116  Arthur Hellman has concluded that the Court’s shrunken docket 
reflects an “Olympian” Court that issues fewer, but more monumental decisions.117 
                                                        
109
  The Court’s own Rule 10 suggests that certiorari will be granted only for “compelling reasons,” based 
upon an “important federal question” or “important matter” that has divided federal courts of appeals, 
divided federal and state courts; and has not been decided by the Supreme Court.   See SUPREME COURT 
RULE 10. 
110
  See Posner, supra note __, at 37-39. 
111
  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the 
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 589-91 (2009) (examining the Court’s 
increasingly controversial Constitutional decisions). 
112
  David O. Stewart, Quiet Times: The Supreme Court Is Reducing Its Workload - But Why?, A.B.A. J., 
Oct. 1994, at 40, 43. 
113
  In 1988, Congress eliminated mandatory appeals from state supreme courts, as well as appeals from any 
courts that invalidate state statutes.  Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662, (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254, 1257, 1258 (2012)).  See also David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the 
Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 
(1997). 
114
  Stephanie Ward, Clerks Avoid Getting Their DIGs In: They Just Say No to Cert Petitions, as the Court's 
Docket Shrinks, ABA J., Mar. 18, 2007. 
115
  Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Age and Tenure of the Justices and Productivity of the U.S. Supreme Court: Are 
Term Limits Necessary?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 161, 164-68 (2006).  
116
  Kevin Fayle, Supreme Slackers?, at http://blogs.findlaw.com/courtside/2009/09/supreme-slackers.html. 
117
  Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 409-29 
(1996). 
Once the Court chooses its cases, the decisions themselves will have political 
consequences and there is ample empirical and scholarly evidence that politics 
plays a role in these decisions.118  The actual process of writing and disseminating 
the opinions also reacts to the salience of the issue at hand, with higher profile cases 
drawing longer, more complex opinions and more dissents and concurrences.119  
The last sixty years have also seen a change in the public perception of the 
Court’s nature and role120 and increased attention to issues of justice selection and 
confirmation.121  Controversy and interest in the selection of Justices selection is 
also at an all-time high.122 
The combination of these factors means that if the Supreme Court has not 
always been a political, policy-making body, it is now.  Richard Posner has led a 
chorus of current scholarship proclaiming the current Court a superlegislature that 
sits chiefly to proclaim broad new law governing categories of new cases, rather 
than a more traditional appellate court, that aims to create uniformity and correct 
                                                        
118
  The empirical evidence has frequently come from political scientists under the rubric “The Attitudinal 
Theory.”  See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note __.  Scholarly evidence has come from all directions.  Consider 
for example the negative reaction to two very different cases: Roe v. Wade and Bush v. Gore.  See, e.g., 
Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional 
Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2011) (discussing the reaction to Roe); Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore 
and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408-9 (2001) (suggesting that Bush v. 
Gore appeared to be motivated by the “‘low’ politics of partisan political advantage”). 
119
  See Posner, supra note __, at 38-39 (“Last Term [2004], 80% of the Court's primarily constitutional 
decisions were by split vote, compared to 63% of its other decisions, and a split decision is more likely to 
attract attention than a unanimous one, in part by generating more – and more contentious – opinions in the 
case. Although only 38% of all the Court's cases were primarily constitutional, 44% of all opinions 
(including concurrences and dissents) were issued in such cases.”). 
120
  See, e.g., Carolyn Dineen King, Challenges To Judicial Independence And The Rule Of Law: A 
Perspective From The Circuit Courts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 773-74 (2007).  
121
  See, e.g., RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS 4 
(2005). 
122
  Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 442-54 
(2010). 
errors.123  Political scientists have likewise argued that the current Supreme Court 
has “virtually untrammeled policymaking authority.”124 
 C.   Do These Justices Fit this Court?  
The remaining question is whether these Justices are a good fit for this Court.  
Supporters can argue that this Court is the most qualified of any Court in history – 
they have spent more time considering and studying constitutional theory and the 
Court itself than any other group.  Moreover, one person’s elitism is another 
person’s highly functioning meritocracy: the current Court arguably evinces a 
salutary desire to have the best of the very best serve in government and to have the 
finest legal minds work on the Court.   
Lastly, supporters might argue that the Court itself naturally tends to be an 
elitist and anti-democratic body.125  It is thus self-defeating to argue that “ordinary 
people,” who have “real life experience” should staff the Court.  Given the 
institutional design, the best practice is to find the very best and most able Justices 
possible to serve critically important life tenures. 
It is somewhat counterintuitive to suggest that group of Justices that have 
spent significant chunks of their pre-Supreme Court lives working in comparatively 
elite, neutral, and cloistered/independent settings are a bad fit for a policy-making 
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  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 323 (2008); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term--Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); see also Sanford Levinson, Assessing 
the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law or Politics?. 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 99-101 
(2010), available at, http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/842.pdf.  For an outstanding description of 
previous thinking about how judges are naturally political in deciding unclear cases, see Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 713-23 (2009).  
124
  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 12, 26 (2002) (characterizing the perception of judges as “objective, dispassionate, and 
impartial” as “The Mythology of Judging”). 
125
  A particularly famous version of this argument considers the Court’s “countermajoritarian difficulty.” 
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16-17 (1962). 
Court.  Perhaps Justices who have extensive experience as appellate judges and law 
professors and who are well versed in abstract thinking on constitutional issues are 
especially well suited to a life on the Court.  Further, given the long-term changes in 
the nature, approach and salience of the Court, it makes sense that Presidential 
appointments would drift towards candidates with unimpeachable backgrounds 
and a history as a judge as a proxy for future performance.126 
Nevertheless, this Part argues that this trend is exactly backwards: as the 
Court begins to more closely resemble a policymaking Olympian body it is especially 
important to appoint individuals with real life experience.  This is because the 
current Supreme Court makes many decisions that are not expressly “legal” at all, so 
technical legal expertise and excellence is not particularly useful.  In some cases it is 
actually harmful.  This Section first considers the experiences these Justices do have, 
and argues that they lead inevitably and unfortunately to increased legal complexity.  
The Section then turns to the missing experiences and argues that complicated, 
multivariate work with real people (politics, lawyering and trial judging) has 
advantages in deciding the cases and regulating the federal courts.  Lastly, “real life” 
experience is a key ingredient in the development of practical wisdom, perhaps the 
most necessary of Justice traits.  
1.  Complexity 
Although long experience in writing judicial decisions or law review articles 
may sharpen analytical reasoning, immersion and excellence in that style of writing 
and reasoning in constitutional cases frequently leads to obfuscation, rather than 
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  See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
clarification.  Evidence abounds the Court’s output has grown less accessible and 
more complex from the Court’s beginning to the present.127  Consider the opinions 
themselves.  Majority opinions have grown substantially longer.128  The prevalence 
of dissenting and concurring opinions has grown drastically.129  The most confusing 
and complex type of decision – those decided by a plurality rather than a majority – 
has also become more common.130  
Empirical and doctrinal legal scholarship further suggests increased 
complexity in the Court’s output.131  Laura Little’s empirical study of the Supreme 
Court’s use of linguistic devices for obfuscatory purposes found “increased 
splintering” within the decisions and “increased opinion length and complexity.”132  
Describing the opinions of the 1980s and 1990s Joseph Goldstein argued that even 
“professional interpreters” would struggle “to unravel what the Court has to say, 
often at great length in heavily footnoted multiple opinions.”133  Robert Nagel 
described the writing as “formalized” and characterized by “elaborately layered sets 
of 'tests' or 'prongs' or 'requirements' or 'standards' or ‘hurdles' [and] standing 
                                                        
127
  Note that correlation does not prove causation.  This section is not arguing that the current selection 
criteria have necessarily increased complexity.  Instead, this section argues that Justices pre-disposed to 
complexity are less likely to reverse the recent trend towards complexity.  
128
  Black & Spriggs, supra, note __ at 632-38.  
129
  See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 221-27 (1997) (noting the trend away from unanimous 
opinions and towards increased use of dissents and concurrences). 
130
  See Spriggs, supra note __, at 519 (“Historically, plurality decisions by the Supreme Court have been 
relatively rare . . . the frequency of plurality opinions dramatically increased in the 1940s and 1950s, the 
occurrence of plurality opinions between 1953 and 2006 has remained fairly steady, with a moderate 
increase during the 1970s when Warren Burger served as Chief Justice.”); Note, supra note __, at 1306-26 
(discussing the growth in the dissenting opinion and the word “respectfully”). 
131
  The best empirical study of Supreme Court complexity is Ryan J. Owens & Justin Wedeking, Justices 
and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1027 
(2011). 
132
  Laura Little, supra note __, at 126-27. 
133
  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBLIGATION TO 
MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 17 (1992). 
amidst a welter of separate opinions and contentious footnotes.”134  Commentators 
have criticized the Court’s treatment of conflict of laws and federal jurisdiction as 
complex and incoherent.135  Complexity and nuance have also led to “stealth 
overruling,” situations where the Court discards a disfavored precedent piece by 
piece, rather than by clearly over-ruling.136   
An easy proxy for the growth in complexity is lawyers and case law.  Over the 
past forty years the number of lawyers per capita, the amount spent on lawyers and 
the numbers and pages of reported judicial decisions have all spiked.137  Legal 
complexity is quite costly.  The most obvious harm is increased transaction and 
compliance costs,138 but it also can lead to crises like the recent financial 
meltdown139 and the BP deepwater spill.140   
If this concern about legal complexity is valid, this group of Justices seems 
particularly ill situated to reverse the trend.  Insofar as the current group of Justices 
                                                        
134
  Robert Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165 (1985); see also Morton J. 
Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term--Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality 
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 98 (1993) (decrying the Court’s creation of a “thick 
undergrowth of technicality” and its development of multipronged tests “everywhere and for everything”). 
135
  See, e.g., Louise Ellen Teitz, Complexity and Aggregation in Choice of Law: An Introduction to the 
Landscape, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in 
Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925 (2004); Little, supra note __. 
136
  See, e.g., Barry Friedman , The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. 
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010).  
137
 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 3-12 (1995). 
138
  See BARTON, supra note __, at 261-62; Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income 
Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 173 (1996) (“Complexity is a major problem for the 
federal tax system. Complexity erodes voluntary compliance with the tax laws, creates a perception of 
unfairness for the system, impedes the effective administration of the tax laws, results in high compliance 
costs, and interferes with economic transactions.”). 
139
  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, Causation, Law, and 
Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299, 299-305, 343-51 (2010) (analyzing the way in which complexity 
played a role in the financial crisis); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009) (same). 
140
  Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the Bp Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 1077 , 1100-1101 (2011).  
can take their jurisprudence of standing141 or the establishment clause142 seriously 
(just to use two particularly galling examples), it is a sign that we are placing too 
much stock in technical excellence and too little in common sense.  Finding the 
smartest people to try to untangle the thorniest problems does not necessarily 
result in elegant solutions.  To the contrary, it may result in over-thinking, over-
writing, and more complexity.  This trend is especially discouraging in the highest 
salience cases: the Court decides cases that have a massive affect on the country as a 
whole in opinions that few can read and understand. 
2.  The Benefits of the Practice of Law, Political Experience and Trial 
Judging 
 
Experiences practicing law and serving as a politician have three notable 
common benefits.  First, in each profession you are directly answerable to third 
parties – either clients or voters.  You serve in a clear master-servant relationship as 
the servant.  This relationship has powerful psychological effects.143  Successful 
lawyers and politicians frequently have to suppress their own natural preferences 
to follow the will of the public or their clients.  Politicians and lawyers are certainly 
both likely to be advocates, but they must temper their advocacy to their audiences 
                                                        
141
  Standing is notoriously indeterminate and results oriented.  Standing cases have been called 
“notoriously inconsistent,” Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2574 (2007) 
(Scalia, J., concurring), a “jumbled mess,” John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, 
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002), “a 
quagmire,” Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory 
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 389 (2006) and a “chaotic collection of rules and standards,” Nancy 
Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 671 (2004).  I have called standing an example of 
indeterminate complexity, cumbersome and hard to predict.  BARTON, supra note __, at 278-83.  There may 
be Court doctrines that are clear and law-based; but standing is not one of them. 
142
  See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006)(”It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is a mess – both hopelessly confused and deeply contradictory.”). 
143
  William O. Fisher, Lawyers Keep Out: Why Attorneys Should Not Participate In Negotiating Critical 
Financial Numbers Reported By Public Company Clients, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1545-46 (discussing 
the “ethos of legal practice” and the “psychological effects of the lawyer/client relationship”). 
and sometimes must work outside of their own preferences.  These acts of self-
control and self-denial can prove helpful for a Justice when her preferences clash 
with her perception of the correct legal decision.  Appellate judges and law 
professors, in contrast, are instructed to be neutral and ignore the preferences of 
outsiders. 
Second, politicians and practicing lawyers operate in busy and complicated 
real life situations.  They cannot operate in a neutral or cloistered fashion, they must 
get elected, find clients, make legal or political arguments.  Trial lawyers and 
politicians must also make their arguments in a manner ordinary people (jurors or 
voters) can understand.  Both jobs encourage the translation of the complicated into 
the explicable, a key (and frequently missing) talent on the Court. 
Lastly, politicians and lawyers frequently must compromise or settle.  There 
is a reason why politics is compared to sausage making – it is a messy business that 
requires give and take from all parties involved.144  Likewise, much of lawyering 
involves negotiation, settling and deal making.145  
The lack of trial judging in addition to the loss of trial lawyering is also 
notable.  Trial judges are required to make actual decisions about the people who 
appear before them, so though they are neutral, they are not cloistered.  The mere 
act of sentencing defendants or witnessing jury verdicts means that trial judges see 
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  Among the recent examples of former politician Justices known for their ability to compromise and 
generate consensus are Chief Justice Warren, RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN 
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 716 (1975) (discussing 
Warren’s dexterous use of power and compromise in Brown) and Justice O’Connor.  See Keith J. Bybee, 
The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty, 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 943, 943-44 (2001) (describing O’Connor as the 
“swing” vote on the Court, who follows “a path of compromise and accommodation”). 
145
  See, e.g., JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW (2008). 
the effects of their work daily.  Moreover, trial judges have a particularly critical 
experience of the American justice system: they work with juries.  In a time of 
expanded judicial power, the Court has been notably suspicious of juries.146  
3.  Regulators 
The Supreme Court is at the head of the process for drafting the Federal 
Rules of Procedure, Evidence, Criminal Procedure, Bankruptcy, Appellate Procedure, 
and Admiralty.147  The Supreme Court has been at the head of the process of drafting 
and amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from the passage of The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934.148  The Supreme Court leads the drafting and amending of the 
rules, although Congress retained the power to revise or reject.  Unless proposed 
rules are rejected, modified, or deferred, they automatically become law, provided 
that Congress has had at least seven months to consider them.149  While the Court 
has ceded some of the rulemaking responsibility to the Judicial Conference,150 the 
Justices are still key players in the process.151 
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  Consider the Court’s refusal to require a jury in trials for petty crimes, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 156-57 (1968) (refusing to grant a jury for crimes punishable by less than six months in jail and 
questioning “the wisdom of allowing untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and criminal 
proceedings”).  The Court’s cases on preemption of state tort actions likewise evince hostility toward juries.  
See Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“Indeed, one would think that tort law, applied by 
juries . . . is less deserving of preservation” because a jury “sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, 
and is not concerned with its benefits”).    
147
  For an overview of these powers and their historical development, see PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 749-65 (3d. ed. 1988). 
148
  See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§2072 (2012).  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015 (1982); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 
27 STANFORD L. REV. 673, 673 (1975).  
149
  Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 
295, 297 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2074, 2075 (2012). 
150
  The current process begins with five advisory committees dealing respectively with the appellate, 
bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence rules.  Any proposed changes to these rules is hashed out by an 
advisory committee, published for public comment, then reconsidered by the advisory committee before 
approval by the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference, the Judicial Conference itself, the 
Supreme Court, and lastly Congress.  For a full overview of the process, see Thomas F. Hogan, The 
Similarly, the Court is also the last word in the interpretation of those Rules.  
A pair of recent decisions – Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly152 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal153 – 
displays the broad contours of this power.  The Court held that Rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) requires plaintiffs to present a “plausible” claim for 
relief in the complaint,154 a significant tightening in pleading standards.155  The text 
of Rule 8 requires only a “short and plain” statement of facts and claims and has 
done so since that Rule’s inception.156  
Given the Court’s linchpin role in these critical functions, a clear 
understanding of how these Rules play out in practice would be helpful.  
Nevertheless, between the loss of time as trial judges and in the private practice of 
law, these Justices have less perspective than ever.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.as
px (last visited February 16, 2012). 
151
  The Chief Justice of the United States is the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference.  See Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Membership, available at, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Membership.aspx (last visited February 16, 
2012).  The Chief Justice also appoints the members of the pertinent committees.  See Judith Resnik & 
Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of 
the United States 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1618-19 (2006).  The Court has the last vote on any rule 
changes before submission to Congress.  See Hogan, supra note __.  Because Congress regularly chooses 
not to act on the Rules, the Court is frequently the last step in the rule-making process.  See Paul J. Stancil, 
Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 78 (2010)(“As 
a practical matter, Congress involves itself in the [rulemaking] process only infrequently.”).  
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  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
153
  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
154
  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 
155
  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
821, 823-31 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3-17 (2010). 
156
  Elizabeth C. Burch, There’s a Pennoyer in My Foyer, 13 GREEN BAG 105, 115 (noting that “the old 
[Rule 8] has not been amended at all” but the Court’s interpretation changed nonetheless). 
Commentators have pilloried Iqbal and Twombly, noting that these cases 
evince hostility to, and ignorance of, litigation practice.157  Correlation does not 
equal causation, but the Supreme Court’s recent trend away from Justices with 
lawyering experience greatly accelerated in the 1980s, and the recent collapse in the 
number of federal court trials began roughly contemporaneously.158 
4.  Practical Wisdom and Virtue Ethics 
 Consider the connection between life experience and “practical wisdom.” 
Practical wisdom has been praised as a judicial characteristic in both the 
Aristotelian manner159 and less formally as a synonym for common sense.160  Under 
its formal or informal descriptions, however, experience creates, shapes and guides 
practical wisdom.  
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  See Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense Of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 951, 967 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and The Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure 
Plausibility Pleading, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 200 (2010).  For other notable critiques, see  
Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal extended Twombly in a dangerous direction); Kevin M. 
Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1932-34 (2009) (noting the Court’s 
empirical weakness in Twombly, acting “with no empirical support that a problem existed, and with no 
exploration of the dimensions of that problem or the efficacy of the Court's newfangled cure”); Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil 
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (decrying the burden that the 
new pleading standard imposes on civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs); A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 460-86 (2008) (asserting that new standard will weed 
out otherwise meritorious claims); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010) (stating that the Court has 
moved the summary judgment inquiry to the pleading stage). 
158
  Compare supra Figure 2 (showing decline in practice experience beginning in the 1980s) with Michael 
Orey, The Vanishing Trial, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, April 30, 2007, available at, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_18/b4032047.htm (“After peaking at 12,018 in 1984, 
the number of civil trials in all federal district courts has dropped precipitously, reaching a new low of 
3,555 last year. That's almost half the number of federal trials that took place 40 years ago, even though the 
number of suits filed during the same period soared from 66,144 to 259,541.”). 
159
  Edward C. Lyons , Reason's Freedom And The Dialectic Of Ordered Liberty, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 157, 
228-31 (2007).  
160
  Consider, for example, Justice Jackson’s famous take on practical wisdom and the Constitution: “There 
is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert 
the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”  Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor has been praised for exactly this virtue.  See Jane E. Stromseth, 
The International Criminal Court and Justice on the Ground, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 427 (2011); Scott 
Bales, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: No Insurmountable Hurdles, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1705, 1711 (2006).  
 Virtue ethics places practical wisdom at the very heart of proper decision-
making.  To simplify in the pursuit of brevity, moral philosophy can be roughly 
separated into three categories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.  
These categories overlap and there is not always agreement that they are separate 
at all.161  Consequentialism judges a moral act by its consequences.  Utilitarianism is 
thus a form of consequentialism.162  Deontology judges a moral act according to an 
external set of rules, regardless of its consequences.  Kant’s moral imperative is an 
example of a deontological alternative to utilitarianism.163   
Virtue ethics, in comparison, focuses on the character of the actor.  Modern 
virtue ethicists work from Aristotle’s vision of virtue as the key to moral decision-
making.164  Virtue ethics are seen as a “third way” around the eternal battle between 
the consequentialists and the deontologists.165  This is because virtue ethics allows 
one to judge an act based on the character of the actor, rather than on the act’s 
results or measuring the act against a rigid, external set of rules.166 
Lawrence Solum has been in the forefront of applying virtue ethics to the law 
as “virtue jurisprudence.”167  He has argued for an “aretaic turn” in the selection of 
Justices, away from their perceived politics and towards a broad examination of 
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  See, e.g., Marcia Baron, Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics, in PERFECTING VIRTUE 18-21 
(Lawrence Jost & Julian Wuerth, eds., 2011). 
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  See, e.g., John L. Watts, Fairness and Utility In Products Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and 
Social Welfare, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 597, 597-98 (2011). 
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  Peter A. Alces, Contract is Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 907-8 (2010).  
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  One of the first modern statements of virtue ethics was G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 
33 PHIL. 1, 1-19 (1958). 
165
  See Christopher Miles Coope, Modern Virtue Ethics, in VALUE AND VIRTUES: ARISTOTELIANISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 37-38 (2006). 
166
  For a prominent recent version of this argument, see ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VALUE ETHICS 
(1999). 
167
  Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 69-76 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue 
Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, 
Virtue Jurisprudence]. 
their virtues, especially Aristotle’s conception of practical wisdom or phronesis.168  
He likewise has criticized empirical efforts to “rank” Justices because of their failure 
to consider the importance of the essentially immeasurable virtue of practical 
wisdom.169   
Solum’s work is of a piece with other explanations of the act of judging.  
Anthony Kronman spends a large chunk of The Lost Lawyer on practical wisdom,170 
and its role in good judging171 and lawyering.172  The idea that the act of judging is 
best described as a craft fits this model as well.173   In sum, virtue jurisprudence 
argues that the interaction between the character of the judge and the act of judging 
is the key question, not the outcomes of the decision (consequentialism) or the 
decision’s compliance with any strict conception of justice (deontology).174   
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  See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 510-12 
(2005).  For an early version of his thinking, see Lawrence B. Solum, Comment, The Virtues and Vices of a 
Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988). 
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  Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament Of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1386-87 (2005) (“Supreme 
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wisdom, both from the bench and in wider public life.”). 
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  See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 53-108 (1993); see also Anthony Kronman, Practical 
Wisdom and Professional Character, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 203, 208 (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel 
Paul eds., 1987). 
171
  KRONMAN, supra note __, at 315-52. 
172
  ID. at 109-62. 
173
  For a classic version of law as craft, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS 213-35 (1960).  For a more modern overview, see Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 2243, 2274-322 (2001). 
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  In recent American jurisprudence, law and economics is the most popular consequentialist theory and 
John Rawls’ Justice as Fairness is among the leading deontological approaches.  Compare JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (6th ed. 
2003).  Of course, not everyone agrees that these categories are useful.  Richard A. Posner, Law and 
Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1990) (“I do not derive my economic libertarian views 
from a foundational moral philosophy such as the philosophy of Kant, or Locke's philosophy of natural 
rights, or utilitarianism, or anything of that sort. I regard moral philosophy as a weak field, a field in 
disarray, a field in which consensus is impossible to achieve in our society. I do not think it provides a 
promising foundation for a philosophy of government.”). 
Practical wisdom is at the heart of the virtue jurisprudence project.175  It is 
thus important to consider what practical wisdom looks like, how to recognize it, 
and how one fosters it.  Book VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics discusses four 
intellectual virtues: science, theory, philosophy and practical wisdom.176  Practical 
wisdom, or “phronesis,” is primarily “concerned with things human and things 
about which it is possible to deliberate;” deliberation about particulars is the heart 
of phronesis.177  Practical wisdom is distinct from the other virtues because it is not 
“concerned with universals only – it must also recognize the particulars.”178  
Animals can have practical wisdom, those animals “which are found to have a power 
of foresight with regard to their own life.”179   
Jeffrey Lipshaw has put it succinctly.  Phronesis is “the ability to deliberate 
well, to deal with universal principles as well as particular actions, to assess which 
actions are conducive to ends, to employ sympathetic understanding in the effort to 
determine what is fair, and to distinguish and abjure mere cleverness in the pursuit 
of a bad end.”180  
                                                        
175
  See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note __, at 202 (“[T]he notion of a just decision cannot be 
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Solum, A Virtue-Centered Account of Equity and the Rule of Law, 142-62, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, 
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  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book VI (W.D. Ross trans., 1908), available at 
http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/Projects/digitexts/aristotle/nicomachean_ethics/book06.html. 
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  Id. at Book VI, Chapter 7. 
178
  Id. 
179
  Id. 
180
  Jeffrey Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward a Theory of Practical 
Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).   
Practical wisdom is not gained by cloistered study and contemplation of the 
neutral principles of law; it is gained in living a varied and challenging life.181 
Aristotle argued that phronesis is “practical, and practice is concerned with 
particulars.  This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have 
experience are more practical than others who know.”182 
The trend in Justice selection criteria seems designed to emphasize “those 
who know” over those with practical wisdom.  Anthony Kronman has noted that 
technical expertise in law without practical wisdom is at the root of the American 
legal profession’s existential crisis.183  Selecting Justices based upon their “merit” 
rather than a fuller look at their character or experiences will likewise prove self-
defeating. 
5.  A Last Word on the Nature of Elite Competition 
This is not to say that these Justices have not ploughed a long and hard road 
to get where they are.  To the contrary, Justices with these resumes have worked 
relentlessly and tirelessly from their earliest ages to be the very best of the best.  
They competed for admission to the very best universities and law schools.  Three 
Justices received fellowships to study in Europe.184  Three Justices served as clerks 
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  ARISTOTLE, supra note __, Book VI, Chapter 7. 
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  KRONMAN, supra note __, at 109-62. 
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  Justices Kagan and Breyer also competed for and received scholarships to study at Oxford University 
(Breyer a Rhodes and Kagan a Daniel M. Sachs Scholarship).  Justice Scalia received a Sheldon fellowship 
from Harvard for European travel and study. 
to Supreme Court Justices.185  Five of the Justices taught at law schools, four of them 
at top ten schools.186  Five of them held a high level law and policy job with either 
the executive branch or the Senate.  Three worked in the Solicitor General’s Office 
and four had previously argued cases before the Supreme Court before becoming 
Justices.187  Eight of the Justices were able to secure jobs as federal appellate 
judges.188  In sum, at each level of their professional careers these Justices have 
competed against their peers for accolades and jobs that were very, very difficult to 
obtain, and won.   
All the same, success in these competitions is a mixed bag.  These 
competitions encourage a particular kind of “head down” focus upon achievement 
above all else.  These career achievements certainly predict an ability to work hard 
and push through difficult and complicated tasks.  They do not, however, tend to 
correlate very strongly with a sense of perspective.   
Each of these various achievements are quite academic.  As argued above, 
these achievements favor technical legal excellence and a particular type of 
intelligence.  It should not be surprising that these Justices produce the types of 
opinions now common on the Court: divided, over-written and complex.  In 
                                                        
185
  Justice Breyer clerked for Justice Goldberg, Justice Roberts clerked for Justice Rehnquist, and Justice 
Kagan clerked for Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Justice Alito clerked for Judge Garth on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Third Circuit, but not the Supreme Court. 
186
  Justice Scalia taught at the University of Virginia, the University of Chicago and Stanford.  Justice 
Ginsburg taught at Rutgers and Columbia.  Justice Breyer taught at Harvard.  Justice Kagan taught at the 
University of Chicago and Harvard.  Justice Kennedy taught at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge 
School of Law.   
187
  Justices Kagan, Alito and Roberts worked in the Solicitor General’s Office.  Justice Ginsburg argued 
several cases before the Supreme Court while working for the ACLU Women’s Rights Project. 
188
  Justice Kagan is the only non-appellate judge now on the Court.  She spent the years before her 
nomination as the Dean of Harvard Law School and as the Solicitor General of the United States. 
comparison, success in the private practice of law or as a politician reward a 
broader and different set of skills.  
Lastly, many of these achievements show a potentially overweening desire to 
be on the Supreme Court.  To paraphrase Plato and quote Douglass Adams, “it is a 
well-known fact that those people who must want to rule people are, ipso facto, 
those least suited to do it.”189  By comparison, it is quite unlikely that the politicians 
or life long lawyers who became Justices were angling for Court appointment from 
the start of their careers.  Multiple prior Supreme Court Justices left the Court to 
pursue other ambitions, it is hard to think of any of these Justices doing the same.190  
CONCLUSION 
 It is empirically demonstrable that the current Supreme Court Justices have 
had different collective experiences than past Supreme Court Justices.  These 
experiences have clustered around particularly elite experiences: time spent at ivy 
league institutions and Stanford, time spent working in high end law/policy jobs for 
the government, time spent in academia, time living in Washington, D.C., and time 
serving as federal appellate judges.  The lost experiences include the private 
practice of law, elective office, and trial judging. 
 After establishing these trends, this Article makes a normative case against 
them.  The success of this argument likely rests upon one’s reaction to elitist 
meritocracy.  If one thinks that lifetime Supreme Court appointments should go to 
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  See DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE RESTAURANT AT THE END OF THE UNIVERSE 38 (1980). 
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  For example, Justice Charles Evan Hughes left the Court to serve as the Republican candidate for 
President, private practice and service as the Secretary of State, among other activities, before returning as 
Chief Justice.  See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 1930-41 5-12 
(2007).  John Jay retired from the Court to two terms as the Governor of New York.  See MAEVA MARCUS 
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1800 7 (1985). 
Justices who have displayed a particular kind of technical legal excellence and a 
single-minded focus upon achievement, the current system is perfect.   
If, on the other hand, we would prefer Justices with more “real life” 
experiences, a return to prior emphasis on the practice of law, trial judging and 
political experience would be welcome.  This might also ameliorate overly complex 
Supreme Court case law and provide some needed practical wisdom to the Court. 
